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Abstract
Since people care about each other, an individual’s willingness to pay to protect an environ-
mental good or service will reﬂect their concern for others who would also be impacted by a
change in the good or service. Through the extended social network, an individual’s willingness
to pay will reﬂect the impacts on people who they do not immediately know. If this eﬀect is not
considered, willingness to pay estimates can be biased. However, extended social networks are
diﬃcult to measure. We therefore explored the potential for egocentric social networks to help
explain variations in willingness to pay. Given the conventional way of describing social networks,
we demonstrate that egocentric social network measures should not be related to willingness to
pay if there is no relationship between the social network measure and the willingness to pay for
a change in the environmental good or service. When the social network measures are increasing
in the willingness to pay for an environmental improvement, then a regression of willingness
to pay on these social network measures will show a positive relationship. Empirically, we ﬁnd
such a relationship in the results of a choice experiment conducted in the central Okanagan of
British Columbia. However, we also ﬁnd that a measure of peoples assessment of the beneﬁts of
development relative to the environmental impacts was a more eﬀective predictor. This may be a
consequence of how the respondent’s egocentric networks were measured. Alternative approaches
to measuring the egocentric social network may be necessary.
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1 Introduction
We are social animals, and how much we care about the environment is likely inﬂuenced by those we
associate with. However, most nonmarket valuation studies in economics do not consider people’s
social ties. This is partly due to the fact that the development of economic models demonstrating
the importance of social networks for individual willingness to pay is relatively recent [Neilson and
Wichmann, 2014]. These results have been developed based on a completely mapped social network.
In most situations of interest, we cannot practically map the whole social network, limiting the
applicability of the theoretical results. Researchers in a number of disciplines have been ﬁnding that
egocentric social network measures add explanatory power to statistical models. Herein we similarly
explore the use of egocentric social network measures as additional regressors for analyzing the
results of a choice experiment. We ﬁnd that these measures do make a signiﬁcant contribution, and
argue that incorporating such measures may reduce the bias that occurs if social network eﬀects are
ignored all together.
Formally, a social network is deﬁned as “a group of people [,each of] who are connected to
some or all of the others following a random or particular pattern in network system [He et al.,
2014].” In network language, this translates into links between nodes in a graph [Watts and Strogatz,
1998, Watts and Witham, 2012]. Nodes show the position of diﬀerent actors in a network and
links measure how involved an actor is, how connected the actor is [Diani and McAdam, 2003]
and represent a ﬂow of potential information and interaction between those actors [Burt, 1984,
Carrasco et al., 2008]. Network positions could facilitate or constrain actors [Diani and McAdam,
2003], and this can be related to centrality measures such as degree and betweenness centrality
[Freeman et al., 1979]. The degree centrality of an actor is the number of other actors they are
directly connected to, while betweenness centrality measures the frequency with which an actor
lies on the shortest path between two other actors. High betweenness centrality may increase the
potential to locate and gain resources from the network and/or exert direct inﬂuence on actions and
priorities of others in the network [Watts and Witham, 2012, Scott, 2011, Jackson, 2009, Carrington
2
et al., 2005, Carrasco and Miller, 2009]. Social network maps provide a way to visualize the routes
for information and resource ﬂow, and centrality measures provide a quantitative measure reﬂecting
the diﬀerent positions actors have in the network.
In this paper, we investigate the eﬀects of egocentric network centrality measures on individuals
marginal rates of substitution between attributes in a choice experiment and by extension the eﬀects
on the willingness to pay for the underlying environmental services reﬂected by the attributes. We
begin by exploring the way that egocentric social network measures may relate to willingness to
pay. We demonstrate that for a relationship to exist between egocentric social network measures
and willingness to pay, either the whole social network is not considered or the egocentric structure
is itself a function of willingness to pay. The choice experiment was administered in the central
Okanagan region, including the city of Kelowna, in British Columbia, Canada. The experiment
oﬀered participants several opportunities to choose between a status quo and two alternatives. We
analyze the survey results using both ﬁxed eﬀects multinomal logit and mixed logit models. We ﬁnd
that the network measures have signs consistent with there being a relationship between the structure
of the network and the willingness to pay. However, signiﬁcance of the estimated parameters depends
on the presence of other covariates, principally one that measures the respondent’s evaluation of the
trade-oﬀ between development and environmental damage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on social
network theories and choice experiments. Section 3 uses the model of Neilson and Wichmann [2014]
to examine how egocentric social network measures might be related to WTP estimates. Section 4
describes the survey methodology and the structure of the network data. Section 5 describes the
econometric model. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 oﬀers some discussion of the results,
and the paper is concluded with a brief conclusion.
2 Social Network Theories and Choice Modeling
The importance of social networks has long been recognized, and Social Network Analysis is a well
established ﬁeld [Prell, 2012]. Humans are social animals, and it follows that people recognize each
other as part of a network system [Diani, 2003, Diani and McAdam, 2003, He et al., 2014, Golub and
Jackson, 2010]. Social network analysis provides mechanisms for both characterizing the position of
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individuals within a network and describing the form of the entire network. [Watts and Witham,
2012, Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994].
While economics has long recognized concern for others (e.g. altruism and bequest motives in
relation to nonmarket valuation), explicit inclusion of social network metrics in economic analyses
is relatively recent [Easley et al., 2012]. Some of the notable studies include: the importance of
information obtained from social networks in inﬂuencing preferences and choice decisions [Manski,
1993, Banerjee, 1992, Samuelson, 2004]; interdependence of choices and social interaction [Brock and
Durlauf, 2002]. [Stopher, 1980]; peer inﬂuence on product attribute preference [Narayan et al., 2011];
word-of-mouth eﬀect in alternative fuel vehicle choices [Struben and Sterman, 2008]; social network
eﬀects on intercity travel mode choice behavior [Dugundji and Walker, 2005]; residential location
choice using simulated network data with varying degrees of distributions and clustering parameters
[Pa´ez et al., 2008]; the eﬀects of vehicle, contextual, and social network attributes on the latent
demand for electric cars using ﬁxed and random mixed logit models [Rasouli and Timmermans,
2016].
Applications of social network analysis to natural resources and non-market valuation are also
emerging. Some of these studies that incorporate social interactions into public goods include Elliott
and Golub [2019], Crona and Bodin [2006], Ostrom [2015], Pretty and Ward [2001], Prell et al.
[2009], Bouma et al. [2008]. Key results include the increase in the likelihood of collective action,
opinion formation, cooperation, resource sharing and social inﬂuence. For instance, Bramoulle´ and
Kranton [2007] show how social networks can inﬂuence some individuals to contribute and others
to free-ride. Neilson and Wichmann [2014] show how aggregate willingness to pay is related to
network centrality and that people are willing to pay more in aggregate for a public good when that
public good provides more beneﬁt to people more central to the society. Watts and Witham [2012]
demonstrates how willingness to pay or willingness to accept amounts are inﬂuenced by the position
of actors (opinion leaders) in a network. Newton [2010] show the eﬀect of coalition behavior on local
public goods provision. Granovetter [2005] demonstrates how overcoming the free-rider problem is
more likely in groups with a dense and cohesive social network.
The overarching result of this emerging work is that social interactions generate variations in
overall valuations of non-market goods, and that treating individuals as independent units of analysis,
as traditionally done in economic science, overlooks this fact. Valuing public goods therefore should
4
JS
AS
SB
MK
JC
WM
JJ
SGNO
KP KC
Figure 1: A social network. Three egos, JS, SB and JJ are identiﬁed, together with their egocentric
networks.
be analyzed through both individual characteristics and social structural attributes [Carrasco et al.,
2008, Neilson and Wichmann, 2014].
3 Modeling Social Network Effects
Figure 1 shows a hypothetical social network with 14 members. Many social network analysis
focus on the structure of the entire network, how dense the linkages are, whether there are isolated
sub-networks, whether there are key nodes through which many paths between nodes pass, etc.
For surveys of the public, it is generally not possible to map the entire social network, making
network level analyses impossible. However, surveys can gather information about the respondent’s
network, their ’egocentric’ network. Below, we introduce egocentric network centrality measures
into regressions predicting responses to our choice experiment. Before doing so, we identify one
possible explanation for the existence of a positive relationship between egocentric network measures
and choices [Borgatti et al., 2013, Hanneman and Riddle, 2005].
Networks can be directed or undirected. In directed networks, a tie goes from one node to
another, and may not be matched by a tie in the other direction. In an undirected network, all ties
between nodes are reciprocal. Most of the analysis of ego networks uses undirected graphs, which
we will do as well, by making any reported directional ties reciprocal [Hanneman and Riddle, 2005].
Three egos are identiﬁed in Figure 1, JS, SB and JJ. We use these below to illustrate several
common network centrality measures, two of which we will introduce into our regressions. JS has
an ego network with only one alter, AS. SB has three alters, MK, WM and JC. Two of these alters
are linked together, while the other is isolated from anyone else in SB’s ego network. JS has four
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alters, SG, NO, KP and KC. Every alter in JJ’s network has at least one tie to another alter. These
three examples illustrate that ego networks can diﬀer in both size and structure. The example also
illustrates the challenge of using egocentric networks when the entire network may matter. The
network has ties between alters across ego networks, and ties from alters to network members that
do not have a direct tie to one of the three selected egos. These additional members and the links
between them may be important to the behavior of the egos we have identiﬁed, through their links
to the alters, but our measures of the ego networks do not register information about the alters’
networks beyond links between alters who are connected to the ego.
The three matrices below, known as adjacency matrices, provide a representation of the ego
network for the three individuals, JS, SB and JJ. The ego is located at the top left of the matrix.
When there is a tie between two diﬀerent people in the network, that entry in the matrix is set to
1. Where there is no tie, then the entry is 0. The matrix is symmetric, reﬂecting that this is an
undirected network, and we are assuming that the network ties are all of equal strength.
JS
AS


0 1
1 0


SB
MK
JC
WM


0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0


JJ
SG
NO
KP
KC


0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0


For the statistical analysis to follow, we will use two numerical measures that represent the
structure of the ego networks, degree centrality and transitivity, also know as the clustering coeﬃcient.
In the exposition here we also include closeness centrality, which is one additional example among
several other network centrality measures that could be examined. We generated our network
measures using Gephi [Bastian et al., 2009]. The deﬁnitions that follow are based on the calculations
implemented in Gephi, which uses algorithms set out in Brandes [2001] and Latapy [2008] for the
centrality measures we use.
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Degree centrality simply measures the number of connections that the ego has [Freeman, 1978,
O’Malley et al., 2012].
Degree centralityi = CD(i) =
∑
j∈Xi
θij (1)
where Xi is the set of vertices in the network that are joined to i by a single edge, and includes i
itself, with θij = 0 when i = j and θij = 1 when there is a connection between i and j. We deﬁne X
to be the extended network for agent i, which included all the agents that can be reached along
paths that include agent i. For regression purposes, we scale the degree centrality and the other
centrality measures to lie between zero and one, by dividing the individual’s degree by ﬁve, the
maximum number of alters that could be named. This does introduce the potential for a truncation
issue, when the network is larger. We assume that such situations are suﬃciently infrequent that
we can ignore them.
Closeness centrality measures the shortest paths linking the ego to their alters, either directly
or indirectly [Opsahl et al., 2010]. Following the notation used in Brandes [2001] we deﬁne closeness
centrality as:
Closeness centralityi = CC(i) =
1∑
j∈Xi
d(i, j)
(2)
where d(i, j) is the length of the shortest path from i to j, with d(i, i) = 0. Notice that when Xi
only contains agent i herself, closeness centrality is undeﬁned. We use the approach implemented
in Gephi, namely setting the closeness centrality equal to zero when the ego has not speciﬁed any
alters. Such conventions are not uncommon for social network measures, and need to be considered
when interpreting results. Notice also that CC(i) = 1/CD(i) for ego networks where the ego is
directly linked to all the alters. As for degree centrality, we normalize this value to lie between zero
and one.
Clustering coefficient or transitivity is deﬁned as
Clustering coeﬃcienti = CT (i) =
2
∑
j,k∈Xi;j<k
I(j, k)
CD(i)[CD(i)− 1]
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Table 1: Centrality measures for example ego networks.
Ego Network
Measure JS SB JJ
Degree centrality (unscaled) 1 3 4
Closeness centrality 1/1 = 1 1/3 = 0.333 1/4 = 0.25
Clustering coeﬃcient 0a 1/3 = 0.333 4/6 = 0.667
a 0 by convention used in Gephi.
where I(j, k) is an indicator that equals 1 if there is an edge joining j and k and zero otherwise [see
Watts and Strogatz, 1998]. When there are CD vertices, then there are CD(CD−1)/2 possible edges,
and the summation provides the number of edges that are actually present. Perfect transitivity
implies everyone in a network is connected , i.e., a network whose components are all cliques [Opsahl
et al., 2010]. Notice that CT is undeﬁned when CD = 0 or CD = 1. The clustering coeﬃcient can
also be interpreted as the number of closed triangles connecting triplets of vertices in the network
as a share of the total possible triangles connecting triplets. If the network only contains one or
two vertices, then no triangles are possible. Again following the convention adopted by Gephi, for
networks where CT is undeﬁned, we set the value to zero.
We aim to examine whether or not characteristics of the self reported network of a survey
respondent impact on the respondents willingness to pay for environmental goods and services. To
do so we propose that individuals care about each others utility. Adapting the formulation used by
Neilson and Wichmann [2014] we begin by assuming that the individual’s utility can be written in
quasilinear form as:
Vi(xi, g) = xi + vi(g) (3)
where xi is individual i’s consumption of a private good and g a public good. If we assume that
individual i cares about the utility of her friends, then we can write the public good contribution to
her utility as
vi(g) = (1− λi)ui(g) + λi
∑
j
aijvj(g) (4)
where ui(g)is ego i’s private utility from the public good and aij is a measure of how much i cares
about the utility of j. By convention we assume that
∑
j aij = 1 and aii = 0. The parameter
0 ≤ λi < 1 measures the amount of i’s utility that comes from the utility of i’s friends. Neilson and
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Wichmann assume that the entire network is known, and thereby express equation 4 in matrix form
as
v = (I−Λ)u+ΛAv
which can be solved for v to yield
v = (I−ΛA)−1(I−Λ) =Wu
The model set out in 3 can be used to determine the compensating variation for a change in the
level of the public good from g0 to g1.
Vi(mi, g
0) = Vi(mi − Ci, g
1)
Applying the deﬁnition of Vi and we have
mi +
∑
j
wijuj(g
0) = mi − Ci +
∑
j
wijuj(g
1)
which simpliﬁes to
Ci =
∑
j
wij
[
uj(g
1)− uj(g
0)
]
Our problem is to explore under what conditions would we expect centrality measures on
egocentric networks to be related to willingness to pay. The simplest possible implementation of the
model developed by Neilson and Wichmann is to set the beneﬁt from a change in the public good
equal to a constant, ∆u. Neilson and Wichmann demonstrate that the row sums of W are equal to
one. This result has a couple of interesting implications for our simplest possible case. First, the
compensating variation will be equal to this constant utility, Ci = ∆u. Second, since the value of λi
does not impact on the row totals in W, then when the change in utility is constant, diﬀerences in
the values of λi do not impact on the value of Ci. Consequently, there should be no relationship
between willingness to pay and any of the measures of centrality for the ego networks if utility is
constant, or by extension there is no relationship between the structure of the network and utility.
We consider two possible sources of variation in the willingness to pay. One source focuses on
W. If agents have something akin to bounded rationality, then perhaps they only consider the utility
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of the people that the agent actually knows. In this case, the willingness to pay would be
Ci = ∆u
∑
j∈Xi
wij
where Xi is the set of alters connected to agent i. When this is the case, if
∑
j∈Xi
wij is increasing
in the measure of Xi, then we would expect to see a positive relationship between the stated
willingness to pay for the proposed change in the public good and measures of centrality for the ego
networks that are increasing in the number of alters, measures such as degree centrality. Similarly,
if
∑
j∈Xi
wij is increasing in the number of connections between alters in Xi, then we would also
expect to see a positive relationship between Ci and measures of network density such as transitivity.
Whether or not the restricted sum of the weights is increasing depends on what is happening to
∑
j∈X\Xi
wij . If the alters to ego i are connected, then this latter sum can increase, and since
∑
j∈X wij = 1, the sum of the weights on i’s egocentric network can fall.
A second source of variation is to make the number of alters an agent has be a function of the
utility that the agent gains from a change in the level of the public good. Since we measure our ego
networks by asking people who they have spoken with in the last six months about environmental
matters, it is reasonable to suppose that people who value the change in the public good more may
also talk about it more. In this case, we would have that
Ci =
∑
j
wij∆u(#Xj)
where #Xj is the count of the number of alters in Xj . In this situation, ∆u(#Xi) is higher, this
contributes to an increase in Ci All else equal, when the ego network is more dense, then ∆u(#Xj)
will also be larger, and thereby contribute more to Ci.
To examine these two sources of variation in Ci,we turn to a random network simulation. The
simulation involves the following steps:
1. Specify the utility for a set of network vertices. This is either constant and equal to one, or
drawn from a distribution centered on one.
2. Specify the degree for each vertex. The degree is either drawn from a uniform distribution
over the range from zero to ﬁve, or translated to a number between zero and ﬁve from the
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variable utility. Therefore, either the network structure is unrelated to utility - people have
the same utility, and talking to others about environmental issues is a random action - or the
connections reﬂect increased utility from improvement in the public good.
3. Construct the network. The iGraph package [Csardi and Nepusz, 2006] in R [R Core Team,
2019] provides a method to construct a random network where each vertex has a speciﬁed
degree.
4. Calculate the weighting matrix W for network. Calculate the compensating variation for each
vertex, as per the two approaches set out above.
5. Sample without replacement a set of vertices, the egos, from the network and calculate a
number of centrality measures for each ego network.
6. Regress the compensating variation on the calculated ego network centrality measures.
7. Repeat steps 1 through 6 a large number of times.
Figure 2 shows the simulation results for regressions on degree centrality and transitivity, for the
truncated network case and the increasing utility case. Regressions for the truncated network case
are mostly negative. With random networks, increasing both the size and density of the ego network
on average reduces the sum of the utility weights for the members of the ego network. In contrast,
with heterogeneity in the utility received from an increase in the public good and with people who
experience a larger increase in utility having a larger network - people who care more talk more
- impacts are positive. The slope estimate is positive for both degree centrality and transitivity
(clustering) centrality.
The simulation results suggest hypotheses that we can test with the choice experiment results.
If the ego states a willingness to pay based on a truncated network, then we expect the regression
coeﬃcients for both degree centrality and transitivity to be negative. If egos who value improvements
in the public good talk to more people about this - have a larger ego network - then we expect the
regression coeﬃcients for degree centrality and transitivity to be positive. No relationship between
willingness to pay and the centrality measures is consistent with equal utility for an increase in the
public good across network members and/or no systematic relationship between network form and
heterogeneity in the utility from an increase in the public good.
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Figure 2: Simulation results.
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4 Data
4.1 Choice Experiment Survey
The choice experiment and the egocentric network measurement instrument were administered
online.The online survey was deemed to be an appropriate and cost-eﬀective tool on the conviction
that the use of computers and Internet among RDCO residents is high. According to Paul Budde
Communication Pty Ltd [2016], Canada has one of the highest broadband penetration rates among
the OECD nations and estimates that broadband availability, particularly in rural and regional
areas close to 98%. [Dillman et al., 2014] also suggests online surveys as one of the tailored mixed
design methods. We tested our survey with sample participants and adjusted the wording and
organization based on responses. We also executed some laptop-based face-to-face and over the
phone interviews at interviewee request. In these cases, each respondent was asked to complete
the survey in the presence of an interviewer at their residence or over the phone with the help of
employed student.
To generate the sample, a list of Central Okanagan addresses was harvested from an online source
that permitted reverse postal code lookup (canada411.com). After cleaning the list, a random sample
of addresses was selected and an invitation letter sent to the address. Addresses were individualized,
using names that were part of the address list, under the expectation that personalized invitations
will generate a higher response rate. The choice task was seen as a household decision, as the
payment vehicle was applied at the level of a residence. However, some demographic questions (e.g.
education, age) collected information on the individual respondent.
The choice experiment oﬀered participants alternatives described using four attributes (Table 2).
These attributes reﬂected aspects of the local environment that the Regional District of Central
Okanagan (RDCO) had identiﬁed as important indicators of the state of the local environment.
They reﬂect a locally scarce resource that people directly use, water; two aspects of local ecological
health, natural terrestrial habitat and aquatic species population numbers; and one socio-cultural
environmental measure, rural character. In consultation with local experts, including RDCO staﬀ,
we established a status quo forecast of how these attributes are likely to have changed thirty years
in the future. We then generated two levels of improvement for each attribute. These improvement
levels were chosen to be reasonably attainable, in order to enhance the credibility of the survey.
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Table 2: Attribute levels and descriptions, as provided to participants through online survey.
Attribute Levels Description
Share of Total
Water Use
from
Groundwater
10%,
15%,
20%
GROUND WATER USE: Groundwater is an important
source of water we use and supports springs and wetlands
that are important natural habitats. Increasing ground water
use threatens these habitats. Most surface sources in the
Okanagan are fully allocated. Increasing the share of total
use from groundwater also reﬂects an increase in overall
water use and in the amount of groundwater used.
Count of
Spawning
Kokanee
Salmon
40,000,
50,000,
60,000
AQUATIC HABITAT HEALTH: Aquatic health is
threatened by shoreline development, invasive species
pollution, etc. Species such as Kokanee salmon are sensitive
to the overall health of the aquatic environment. Since the
70’s, spawning Kokanee numbers in Okanagan lake have
fallen from over 1 million to about 40,000.
Sensitive
Ecosystem
Area Lost
100 km2,
50 km2,
0 km2
NATURAL HABITATS: Natural habitats, such as
wetlands, forests, natural grasslands, etc. provide a range of
environmental goods and services. These environmental
resources and services are largely lost if the land is developed.
Population
Density in
Rural Areas
60 ppl / km2,
70 ppl / km2,
75 ppl / km2,
RURAL CHARACTER: Rural areas have a unique
character that reﬂects their history and close ties to the land.
Increasing development and population growth in rural areas
increases traﬃc, reduces the amount of open space, increases
conﬂict between farmers and non-farm residents, and impacts
natural habitats.
Special
Property Levy
$0.00,
$20 / $400,000
$40 / $400,000
COST: The tools that can reduce groundwater use, improve
aquatic health, limit loss of natural habitats and reduce
population growth in rural areas do have a cost. However
they are paid, they will leave your household with less money
to spend each year.
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We used parcel levy as the payment vehicle. This was chosen as parcel levies have been used
locally to ﬁnance a variety of projects. For example, the H2O aquatic center in Kelowna was funded
in part by a levy on Kelowna properties of about $0.21 per $1,000 value for twenty years, and
ongoing activities to control the invasive aquatic plant, Eurasian milfoil in valley lakes is paid for by
a $0.057 per $1,000 collected by the Okanagan Basin Water Board. Each alternative to the status
quo involved a levy of either $0.05 per $1,000 or $0.10 per $1,000. These values scale to $20 and $40
for the average RDCO residential property, which at the time of the survey was selling for around
$400,000. The levy would take eﬀect immediately and continue for thirty years.
Figure 3 provides an example of a choice card used in the experiment. Each respondent was
presented, in sequence, with six such choice cards. Graphics were included to make it easier for the
participant to recognize the relative size of the changes. In addition to oﬀering the respondents the
three way choice, we also asked them to choose between the two alternatives, if the status quo was
not oﬀered. For the analysis to follow, we only use results for the three choice situation.
A name generator was used to identify up to ﬁve members, by initials, of each participant’s
egocentric network, with the speciﬁc instructions “During the last six months, who have you
talked with about how growth and development are impacting the environment in the Central
Okanagan?” See Carrasco et al. [2008] for a similar survey. As noted by Campbell and Lee [1991] and
Marsden [2005], name generators that specify a constrained time and a speciﬁc type of interaction
tend to result in smaller networks. As our interest was speciﬁc to concern for the future state of
the environment, requiring a speciﬁc type of relationship and relatively recent contact would be
appropriate for our purposes. Respondents were asked to rate the strength of the relationship as
very close, close or acquaintance, and asked to provide, as best they could, information about gender,
income, education, political orientation, physical distance between residences, frequency of contact,
length of relationship, and purpose (e.g. children are friends, common faith community, work,
sports team, etc.). The name generator included a relationship table, where survey participants
indicated if their named alters knew each other. They were able to specify directed connections,
as very close, close, or stranger, between each alter-alter pair. For the analysis reported below, all
connections were assumed to be undirected. The collected data will enable us in future to explore
further network features [e.g. homophily, see Macias and Williams, 2016] on willingness to pay.
15
Figure 3: Example choice card.
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4.2 Survey Results
Invitations were mailed to 3,000 residential addresses, approximately 10% of which were invalid
(moved, etc.). 550 invitees started the online survey, resulting in 468 completed questionnaires
(17.3% response rate). Identifying the sample through internet phone book address harvesting was
not ideal. For online phone books, listed people either have a land line, or have manually added
address information to a mobile phone number. To the extent that younger, more technologically
sophisticated and/or more mobile residents (renters, persons multiple residences, only one of which
is in the Okanagan, etc.) do not have publicly available addresses, such people would be less likely
to receive an invitation to participate in the survey. Sample demographic measures are consistent
with this.
Figure 4 compares the Statistics Canada Community Proﬁle for the Regional District of Central
Okanagan age, education and income distributions with those reported by the survey participants.
The sample is clearly over represented by the older half of the population. It is somewhat over
represented by people who have continued their education beyond high school, and seriously under
represents people who did not complete high school or only completed high school. The sample
also has less representation by those with the lowest incomes, and somewhat higher representation
among almost all the middle and upper income categories. The results therefore apply to an older,
somewhat more educated and somewhat more aﬄuent segment of the central Okanagan population,
and extrapolation to the entire population needs to be done with care.
In the sample, 64% of respondents who answered the gender question chose male, with 118 of
468 not providing an answer. One person indicated that they were a member of a First Nation, with
115 of respondents not answering. Fully 91% of those who indicated home ownership owned their
home. Among answering respondents, 81% were couples, with 25% having children living at home.
Almost 85% of respondents indicated an awareness of the environmental issues that were the
subject of the survey, prior to completing the survey. When asked if on balance the beneﬁts of
development outweighed the negative impacts on the environment, only 10% saw the balance
as neither negative or positive. The remaining 90% was almost equally divided between very
negative, negative and somewhat negative, and the corollary positive opinions. Given the somewhat
higher income and education levels, this balanced opinion is somewhat surprising. Very few
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Figure 4: Comparison of sample and census distribution for age, education and income.
respondents indicated having any formal education in environmental or biological topics, nor being
involved professionally with environmental issues. Overall, our sample is biased towards older, more
educated and more aﬄuent central Okanagan residents who consider themselves informed about
environmental issues in the valley. However, it is not biased towards people who are strongly in
favor of environmental protection or of development.
Figure 5 plots the share of the choice experiment responses that are not the status quo for each
survey participant, against four diﬀerent centrality measures. In all four cases, the likelihood that a
participant chooses an alternative to the status quo is increasing in the network centrality parameter.
The ﬁgure also illustrates diﬀerences in the way that centrality measures can be calculated. The
iGraph package in R does not normalize the centrality measures. We chose to normalize by dividing
by the maximum possible network size, ﬁve. The Gephi program divides closeness centrality by
degree to normalize. For an ego network, any network with at least on member will have a closeness
centrality measure equal to one, with the Gephi convention of setting undeﬁned values to zero
meaning all respondents who didn’t specify any alters would be zero. This centrality measure is
therefore a dummy indicating whether the participant named any alters. This highlights how the
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Figure 5: Frequency choosing alternative to status quo.
method of calculating and the way of measuring the networks will impact the relationships that are
observed between network measures and other variables.
5 Econometric Model
Our survey oﬀered participants scenarios that varied along four environmental quality dimensions
and one cost dimension. Participants were also asked to provide demographic, knowledge and
opinion information. We therefore have alternative speciﬁc variables that vary with each of the
alternatives oﬀered to the participant, and individual speciﬁc variables that are constant for each
individual.
We follow the conventional random utility model [McFadden, 1980, 1978] where the utility
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individual i receives from choosing alternative j ∈ [1, . . . , J ] in choice situation k ∈ [1, . . . ,K] is
Vijk = Uijk + ǫijk
where Uijk is the utility the individual receives that is a function of observable characteristics of the
alternative and the choice situation. The error term ǫijk captures unobserved factors contributing to
the utility individual i receives, and is assumed drawn from an i.i.d. extreme value type 1 (Gumble)
distribution.
In each choice situation k, the individual is assumed to choose that alternative which maximized
utility. If Jk indexes the alternatives available in choice situation k, then the choice made will solve
max
j∈Jk
[Uijk + ǫijk]
The probability that individual i chooses alternative j is
Pr(j) =
∏
l∈Jk\i
Pr(Uijk + ǫijk > Uilk + ǫilk)
=
∏
l∈Jk\i
Pr(Uijk − Uilk > ǫilk − ǫijk)
the probability that alternative j provides greater utility to i than any of the other alternatives in
Jk. Given the assumptions on the distribution of ǫijk, this probability can be expressed as
Pr(j) =
Uijk∑
l∈Jk
Uilk
It is common to assume that the utility is a linear function
Uijk = x
′
ijkβ + ǫijk
where xijk is a K × 1 vector describing the characteristics of the choice situation and alternative
that the individual is evaluating. The parameter vector β measures the inﬂuence of the elements of
xijk on the likelihood that j is chosen.
In addition to the impact of alternative and situation speciﬁc variables on the choice probability,
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we are also often interested in the eﬀect of individual speciﬁc characteristics. This would redeﬁne
the utility function as
Uijk = x
′
ijkβ + z
′
iγ + ǫijk
where zi is a vector of characteristics describing individual i and γ measures the impact of these
individual characteristics on the utility individual i receives from choice j in situation k.
While we expect individual speciﬁc characteristics to aﬀect the utility individuals receive from
their choices, estimating these eﬀects is challenging. For a ﬁxed eﬀects model, we add a dummy
variable λi for each individual as
Uijk = x
′
ijkβ + z
′
iγ + λi + ǫijk
Since the variables in zi are constant for each individual, they are perfectly colinear with each other
and with λi. We can therefore add at most one individual speciﬁc variable to a regression model
like this, and that is only when there is no ﬁxed eﬀect. However, interactions can be estimated, as
Uijk = x
′
ijkβ + x
′
ijk ⊙ z
′
iγ + λi + ǫijk
where ⊙ indicates a Hadamard product (element by element). Typically many elements of γ are
assumed to be zero, and restricted as such in the estimation.
An alternative method of including individual speciﬁc eﬀects follows from a random parameters
model. Here we assume that each individual has a unique vector of responses to the attribute and
choice situation characteristics. Often the assumption is that βi ∼ N(β,Σ). Relying on the fact
that Σ can be factored as LL′ by a Cholesky decomposition, we can write
βi = β + Lη, η ∼ N(0, I)
and individual speciﬁc characteristics can be included as
βi = β + z
′
iγ + Lη
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with utility now deﬁned as
Uijk = x
′
ijk(β + z
′
iγ + Lη) + λi + ǫijk
which requires integrating out the inﬂuence of η before estimation of the logistic regression. This
integration is typically simulated, through a maximum simulated likelihood approach.
For policy purposes, we are often interested in the marginal rate of substitution between variables,
in particular the marginal rate of substitution between attribute levels and income. The marginal
rate of substitution is deﬁned as
MRSxy = −
dx
dy
∣∣∣∣
U
= −
∂U/∂x
∂U/∂y
∣∣∣∣
U
with the amount of income an individual would give up to get a unit increase in a choice experiment
attribute being
WTPA =MRSCA = −
∂U/∂xC
∂U/∂xA
∣∣∣∣
U
where the subscripts C and A indicate cost and the attribute level respectively. When there are no
interactions, then the willingness to pay resolves to
WTPA = −
βA
βC
However, if individual speciﬁc eﬀects are included, either as interactions or as shifters for the means
of the random parameters, then the willingness to may need to include these interactions. For
example, if income is included as an interaction with the cost variable, then
WTPA = −
βA
βC + βICxI
if we are interested in the willingness to pay at the mean. With individual speciﬁc variables included
in this way, we can also explore how willingness to pay changes across the respondents, and could
also adjust either the mean income, or the distribution of incomes, to reﬂect a population diﬀerent
from that who responded to the survey invitation.
Hypothesis testing for ratios of parameter estimates is problematic. If the parameter estimates
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are assumed to follow a normal distribution, then their ratio follows a Cauchy distribution, and does
not have deﬁned moments. This presents particular problems if there is a signiﬁcant probability that
the parameter is close to zero - low signiﬁcance of the parameter estimate - which translates into
signiﬁcant probability that large values can be realized. The standard error of the ratio calculated
by the delta method [Greene, 2012] may therefore be inaccurate. Bootstrap methods have been
proposed as alternatives [Krinsky and Robb, 1986, Hole, 2007], but are subject to the same issue
as bootstrap realizations can generate values for the cost parameter close to zero [Carson and
Czajkowski, 2019]. Diﬀerent approaches to estimation have also been proposed. One suggestion is
to estimate the entire system in willingness to pay space by restricting the parameter on the cost
variable to equal one, and estimating a scaling parameter that applies to the attributes being priced
[Scarpa et al., 2008]. Another is to deﬁne the cost parameter as a function, such as an exponential,
that cannot be zero [Carson and Czajkowski, 2019].
6 Results
6.1 Regression Results
Results for ﬁve ﬁxed eﬀects multinomial regression models are shown in 3. The ﬁrst model only
includes the attribute levels and an intercept term for the alternatives. All models were also run
with one alternative speciﬁc constant for each alternative. We have opted to estimate the models
restricting the alternative speciﬁc constants to be equal for two reasons. First, when we consider
the random parameters models, almost all of the models estimated with the alternative speciﬁc
constants restricted to be equal score a lower AIC value than the models where this restriction
is relaxed. Second, there is no theoretical reason to expect the alternative speciﬁc constants to
diﬀer. We acknowledge that an experimental design eﬀect may be present, where subjects assume
a ranking where left, status quo, is worst and right, the second alternative, is best. While the
ﬁxed eﬀects models suggest that this may be the case, for ease of comparison with the random
parameters results, we report only ﬁxed eﬀects model results where the alternative speciﬁc constants
are restricted to be equal. Qualitatively, models with two alternative speciﬁc constants and as
appropriate interaction terms with those constants are similar, and imposing this restriction does
not impact on the interpretation of the results.
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Table 3: Fixed eﬀects multinomial logit regression results.
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5
Groundwater Use −0.014 −0.015 −0.015 −0.015 −0.015
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Aquatic Health 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Habitat Loss −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural Character −0.011 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012 −0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Levy −0.760 −6.472∗∗ −6.415∗∗ −6.441∗∗ −6.432∗∗
(1.579) (1.968) (1.993) (1.993) (1.994)
Alternatives Constant 0.216 0.014 −0.186 −0.220 −0.230
(ASC) (0.120) (0.132) (0.396) (0.396) (0.396)
Levy × Income 0.056∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
ASC × Degree 0.048
(0.038)
ASC × Transitivity 0.494∗∗∗ 0.303∗
(0.133) (0.138)
ASC × Age 0.008 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ASC × Education 0.155∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.136∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
ASC × Devel. Good −0.206∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Log Likelihood -1865.241 -1844.967 -1830.295 -1829.515 -1827.882
χ2 (df = NA) 71.655∗∗∗ 112.202∗∗∗ 141.548∗∗∗ 143.107∗∗∗ 146.373∗∗∗
pseudo R2 0.019 0.030 0.037 0.038 0.038
Num. obs. 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823
AIC 3742.482 3705.935 3680.589 3681.030 3677.764
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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In all cases the parameters estimated for the attribute levels have the expected signs. Increasing
groundwater use, increasing habitat loss, and increasing the population density in rural areas all
are negative, indicating that utility falls when these measures increase. Increasing aquatic health,
measured as one thousand additional spawning salmon each year has a positive sign, suggesting
that this increases utility. Finally, the property levy has a negative sign, consistent with people
feeling worse oﬀ if the levy they pay is greater, all else equal.
Absent any covariates (Model #1), the disutilty from an increase in the levy is far from signiﬁcant.
This lack of signiﬁcance on the levy would render estimates of the willingness to pay for improvements
to not be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
In Model #2 we add two covariates, an interaction term between the level of the levy and the
respondent’s income, and an interaction term between the alternatives constant and the egocentric
network transitivity measure. Both are highly signiﬁcant. The transitivity estimate is positive,
consistent with the simulation results described above. This is therefore consistent with those who
gain more utility from the environmental improvements being more likely to speak with others about
issues around development and the environment in the Okanagan. We introduce the interaction
between levy and income to allow for a change in the sensitivity to the size of the levy as a function
of income. This eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant here, and for all the other models where it is present.
The positive sign is consistent with the expectation that people with higher incomes are less sensitive
to the size of the levy. Adding these two covariates leads to a large increase in the size of the
parameter on the levy term, and with this increase it becomes strongly signiﬁcant. Consequently,
estimates of the willingness to pay for changes in the attribute levels are now likely to be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, at least where the parameter estimates are. Adding these two covariates does
not substantially change the magnitudes nor signiﬁcance of the four attribute levels, an eﬀect that
doesn’t change with the other combinations of covariates.
In Models #3 through #5 we add two demographic variables, age and education, and one
perception variable. The perception variable is based on the statement “Development and growth
has led to large reductions in natural habitats. These changes have also brought jobs and improved
the standard of living for Okanagan residents.” Respondents were asked to indicate there evaluation
of these changes by choosing on a Likert scale from “very bad (=0)” to “very good (=6)”. Non
responses and don’t know were coded as neutral. Age is not signiﬁcant in any models. Education is
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signiﬁcant to at least the 1% level for all models. The interaction between the alternatives constant
and the development perception is negative and strongly signiﬁcant for all three models. If people
who view the beneﬁts of development as ’worth’ the environmental cost, and see this as continuing
to be the case, then we would expect them to be less willing to pay for actions that would make
development more diﬃcult.
Model #4 includes the degree of the respondent’s egocentric measure as an interaction covariate,
and model #5 includes transitivity. Degree is not signiﬁcant at the 5% level, although it does have
a positive sign that is consistent with the hypothesis that respondents who earn more utility from
environmental improvements are more likely to talk with people about environment and development
issues. The transitivity measure is still positive, and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The somewhat
smaller size and lower signiﬁcance suggests that people who perceive the costs to the environment
of development as being too large are also likely to talk with others about these issues.
Relative to a null model with only an intercept, these ﬁve models are all strongly signiﬁcant.
The AIC ranks Model #5 as best of these, and it is better than many, though not all, of the other
speciﬁcations examined. Those that have a lower AIC relax the restriction that the alternative
speciﬁc constants are equal. As noted above, we present results for these models as comparison to
the random parameters models.
Estimation results for the random parameters models are shown in Table 4. The random
parameters are the four attributes, the levy, and the alternatives constant. The mean of the levy
parameter is allowed to be a function of the respondent’s reported income level, while the mean of
the alternatives constant is allowed to be a function of the respondent’s age, education, attitude
towards development, and their social network.
The parameters on the environmental attributes are very stable across the model speciﬁcation.
In Model #6, without any covariates, the mean of the levy parameter is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. Including a relationship between the levy parameter and income substantially increases
the size of the levy parameter estimate, making it signiﬁcant at the 5% level for all four models
where it is added. While the levy parameter is now signiﬁcant, that is not the case for income eﬀect
on the levy parameter. The standard deviation estimates for the levy parameter do not change
much when income is added as a predictor for the parameter value. Therefore, the eﬀect of adding
income is to right shift the distribution of the levy eﬀect without substantially changing the shape
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Table 4: Random parameters multinomial regression results.
#6 #7 #8 #9 #10
Groundwater Use −0.027∗ −0.027∗ −0.027∗ −0.026∗ −0.027∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Aquatic Health 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Habitat Loss −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Rural Character −0.025∗ −0.025∗ −0.025∗ −0.024∗ −0.025∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Levy −4.913 −12.681∗ −11.582∗ −12.432∗ −11.705∗
(3.174) (5.205) (5.140) (5.064) (5.164)
Alternative Speciﬁc 4.555∗∗∗ 3.274∗∗∗ −0.483 3.586 −0.277
Constant (ASC) (0.738) (0.787) (2.374) (2.505) (2.520)
Levy × Income 0.075 0.070 0.077 0.068
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
ASC × Degree 0.139
(0.242)
ASC × Transitivity 2.118 1.063
(1.110) (0.834)
ASC × Age 0.721∗ 0.613∗ 0.696∗
(0.289) (0.296) (0.338)
ASC × Education 0.076∗ 0.011 0.060
(0.035) (0.031) (0.035)
ASC × Devel. Good −0.758∗∗ −0.763∗∗ −0.688∗∗
(0.252) (0.284) (0.256)
Random Parameter Standard Deviations
Groundwater Use 0.055∗ 0.051 0.053 0.048 0.050
(0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029)
Aquatic Health 0.028 0.030∗ 0.029∗ 0.030∗ 0.031∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Habitat Loss 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Rural Character 0.098∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Levy 32.245∗∗∗ 32.183∗∗∗ 31.869∗∗∗ 30.817∗∗∗ 32.216∗∗∗
(3.485) (4.000) (3.173) (3.123) (3.558)
ASC 5.990∗∗∗ 5.936∗∗∗ 6.001∗∗∗ 6.464∗∗∗ 5.894∗∗∗
(0.811) (0.931) (0.680) (0.856) (0.780)
Log Likelihood -1355.129 -1351.669 -1346.848 -1346.844 -1346.440
χ2 (df = NA) 232.945 239.865 249.508 249.516 250.323
Pr(< χ2)
pseudo R2 0.079 0.081 0.085 0.085 0.085
Num. obs. 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823
AIC 2734.259 2731.338 2725.695 2727.688 2726.881
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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of the distribution.
The egocentric network transitivity measure is added in Model #7. When included as a shifter
for the alternatives constant, it is signiﬁcant at the 10% level, but not quite attaining the 5%
signiﬁcance level. As for the ﬁxed eﬀects model, when other covariates are added, the signiﬁcance
of the network measure decreases. In this case, becoming insigniﬁcant even at the 10% level. The
degree centrality measure (Model #8) is far from signiﬁcant when the covariates are present, and
didn’t attain even 10% signiﬁcance when added without the covariates.
The further three covariates are again Age, Education and the perspective on the development
and environment trade-oﬀ. In contrast with the ﬁxed eﬀects model results, Age is now signiﬁcant
for all three models where it is included, and education is only signiﬁcant in one. As for the ﬁxed
eﬀects model, the respondent’s perspective on development is a strongly signiﬁcant shifter for the
alternatives constant. It is also noteworthy that when these three covariates are present, the mean
of the alternatives constant is zero.
The standard deviation estimates for the random parameters are strongly signiﬁcant for habitat
loss, rural character, the levy, and the alternatives constant. For most of the models, they are
not signiﬁcant for groundwater, and for aquatic health, they are signiﬁcant at the 5% level, but
not at the 1% level. Respondents are therefore fairly similar in how they respond to reductions in
groundwater use and increases in salmon spawning returns. However, there is a large variety in
the way that people respond to changes in the amount of habitat loss and the population density
in rural areas. Using the standard deviation estimates, almost one quarter of respondents would
see an increase in utility from more habitat loss, and almost half would similarly see an increase in
utility from an increase in rural population density.
6.2 Willingness to Pay
Figure 6 shows the mean willingness to pay (WTP) for the four environmental attributes, with
conﬁdence intervals calculated using the Delta method, the parametric bootstrap method [Krinsky
and Robb, 1986] and the nonparametric bootstrap method. The parametric bootstrap generates the
distribution of WTP estimates from random samples of parameter values drawn from a multivariate
normal distribution of the parameter space. The nonparametric bootstrap was generated by
estimating the parameters from a resampling of the set of individuals participating in the choice
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Figure 6: Willingness to pay mean values, conﬁdence intervals, and P values, generated using the
Delta method, the parametric (Krinsky Robb) and non-parametric bootstrap. WTP values and P
values are square root scaled. For each model, the left conﬁdence interval is generated using the
Delta method, the central interval from the parametric bootstrap, and the right interval from the
nonparametric bootstrap.
experiment, and using these parameter estimates to generate estimates of the WTP. P values for the
Delta method are based on the z -score, while for the bootstrap methods are based on an ordering
of the simulated WTP values and the interpolated position of the comparison value - zero - within
this ordered list.
While the parameter estimates for aquatic health and habitat loss are strongly signiﬁcant, the
willingness to pay values are not. When the size of the levy is interacted with income, the levy
parameter becomes strongly signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed eﬀects models, and signiﬁcant at the usual
level of 0.05 for the random parameters models. If the WTP was calculated using only the levy
parameter, it would be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. However, as derived above, this is incorrect
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when there are interaction terms. The levy parameter and the parameter on the interaction between
levy and income in the ﬁxed eﬀects model are strongly negatively correlated, with the result that the
variance of their mean income weighted sum is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and the resultant
WTP estimates are themselves not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. For the random parameters
models, the parameter estimated for the interaction between levy and income is not signiﬁcant, and
consequently when combined with the levy parameter, the resultant combination again has a high
variance, and consequently the WTP estimates are not signiﬁcant.
Including the interaction between income and the size of the levy allows us to examine the
impact of income on willingness to pay. That the interaction parameter is positive means that the
disutility from an increase in the levy is diminishing with increasing income. As estimated, this
disutility becomes zero for incomes not far beyond the sample mean income level. The implication
is that the higher income participants in this experiment would be better oﬀ with a higher levy. To
examine the robustness of this result, we also estimated the models using the logarithm of income.
Results are no diﬀerent.
Accepting that the results are not very precise, we can discuss the implied value of environmental
improvements if the true value is the average estimated value. Using the random parameter
estimates, which are smaller than the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, the average respondent is willing
to pay approximately $2.20 to reduce the share of Okanagan water coming from groundwater,
approximately $2.40 to see an increase of 1,000 spawning Kokanee salmon, approximately $0.75 for
a one square kilometer reduction in the amount of natural habitat loss, and approximately $2.00
to reduce the increase in rural population density by one person per square kilometer. Assuming
100,000 households, the annual value of these environmental improvements is $220,000, $240,000,
$75,000 and $200,000 respectively. Of the four attributes described, aquatic health and habitat loss
are probably the best understood by the participants. The limited or absent signiﬁcance on the
parameter estimates for groundwater share and rural character suggest that either people didn’t
particularly care about these attributes, or were confused by them.
Examining the standard deviation estimates for the random parameters provides a perspective
on the variation in how the participants respond to changes in the attribute levels. Figure 7 shows
the coeﬃcient of variation, the ratio of the estimate of the parameter standard deviation to the
estimate of the mean. The conﬁdence intervals are calculated using the Delta method, although
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Figure 7: Coeﬃcient of variation for random parameter estimates.
these estimates are also ratios of random variables and therefore face the same issues as for the
willingness to pay.
The absolute variation is largest for rural character, and the ratio tends to be signiﬁcant. The
absolute value of the ratio is the smallest for aquatic health, and is only marginally signiﬁcant. Using
the estimated mean and standard deviation, 29.8% of the population is expected to have a positive
response to an increase in the rate of groundwater use, 16.7% a negative response to an increase in
salmon returns, 22.1% would have a positive response to an increase in habitat loss, and 39.8% a
positive response to an increase in rural population density. The relatively weak signiﬁcance for
the standard deviation estimates for groundwater share and aquatic health suggest that there may
not be that much variation in responses. However, for habitat loss and increasing rural population
density, the estimates suggest that there is a large variation between people in the population in
how they respond to changes in these attributes, and that a relatively large share of the population
actually see their utility decreasing if these attributes are improved (as deﬁned in the experiment).
7 Discussion
Our experimental design sought to test for the presence of a social network inﬂuence on the
willingness to pay for environmental improvements. While egocentric social network measures do
add signiﬁcant explanatory power to the model when there are no other covariates in the estimated
models, adding covariates, particularly a measure of the respondents perceptions about the relative
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beneﬁts of development, reduce or eliminate the signiﬁcance of the egocentric centrality measures.
Our measurement of the egocentric network is consistent with previous work using a name
generator and framing the name generator with a time limit and topic of conversation [Campbell
and Lee, 1991, Youseﬁ-Nooraie et al., 2019]. This means that the measured social network is not a
network of connections reﬂecting concern for others, the type of network that Neilson and Wichmann
[2014] examine in their analysis. The egocentric networks that we measured reﬂect communication
about development and environmental issues in the Okanagan, communication that is likely more
common among people who feel that the harm done by ongoing development in the Okanagan is
large. The dependence of the measured social network on the way that the network was measured
is a topic of ongoing research [Marsden, 2011, Shakya et al., 2017], and our results highlight the
importance of the name generator. Mapping the networks of concern requires a name generator
that identifying those alters whose utility changes most impact the ego’s utility. The subsequent
name interpreter would be used to explore the direction of and extent to which the subject of the
choice experiment aﬀects the utility of the alters. Further work such as this is needed to develop
methods for capturing the potential bias identiﬁed by Neilson and Wichmann.
The use of egocentric social network measures in nonmarket valuation research is limited.
The inﬂuence of peers is indirectly accounted for by including variables like membership in an
environmental organization or participating in volunteer work. Some recent work, such as Axsen
et al. [2013], Wall et al. [2014] and Kim et al. [2017] have included measures derived from egocentric
network data in choice experiment regressions. The consistency of the eﬀects is mixed, and the
theoretical development varies. Kim et al. [2017] do develop a model reﬂecting social distance,
and ﬁnd that closer individuals are more inﬂuential on transportation choice decisions. That these
studies incorporate egocentric network information in quite diﬀerent ways suggests that there is
scope for further development in this area.
In our survey, the measured egocentric social networks seem to capture concern for the environ-
mental impact of development in the Okanagan. This is also captured by a perception measure we
included, that asks respondents if they think the environmental impacts of development are ’worth
it’. This variable was a strongly signiﬁcant and stable predictor in many of the models examined.
Our choice experiment would ﬁt broadly with studies that estimate the willingness to pay for some
form of environmental protection. Implicitly, that protection is being considered means that some
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activities or uses will be limited, uses which must generate some beneﬁt to some portion of the
population. We have not seen measures that directly measure people’s relative assessment of the
beneﬁts and costs of not introducing protections. Recent examples would include Gundlach et al.
[2018], who examined the willingness to pay for a car free city center, without asking directly about
the perceived beneﬁt of car access relative to the costs - noise, congestion, pollution - generated by
car access. Similarly, Jin et al. [2018] examine the willingness to pay for cultivated land protection
in China, without asking participants if feel that the beneﬁts of loosing cultivated land are worth
it. It is more common to include measures of education and environmental awareness, measures
which often are found to have little explanatory power. Perhaps the weak predictive power comes
from the fact that people can be educated and environmentally knowledgeable, and also view the
beneﬁts resulting from environmental damage being worth it. We suggest that including a measure
of participant’s perception of the beneﬁts of not protecting the environmental resource in question
can improve the precision of willingness to pay estimates, as demonstrated in our regression results.
This perception that the beneﬁts of development are worth the environmental consequences
may be particularly relevant in the Okanagan. The Regional District of Central Okanagan has been
experiencing ongoing high rates of population growth, and the local economy is heavily dependent on
real estate development. This may extend to the willingness to pay estimates as well. The willingness
to pay to protect natural habitats is quite low, relative to the price of land in the Okanagan, and
the willingness to pay to protect rural character is not signiﬁcant. Both of these parameters also
have highly signiﬁcant standard deviations. Development in the Okanagan, a destination for retirees
and amenity migrants, typically occurs in rural areas and areas that were here to for natural. Many
retirees move to the Okanagan to build their dream home in the woods with a view of the lake,
and many Okanagan developers and real estate agents work hard to sell this dream. Those who
understand their connection to the development industry likely would not choose alternatives that
in eﬀect mean limiting development.
In contrast, there is a fairly high willingness to pay to enhance aquatic health, as measured by
the spawning rate of Kokanee salmon. Salmon are an iconic species in British Columbia, central
to the indigenous cultures, and seen by many in the settler culture as something that needs to be
protected. In eﬀect, if British Columbians are able to protect the salmon, then they can feel good
about how they are protecting the environment. Salmon is something easy to understand, and
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restricted to riparian areas, where terrestrial needs, such as connectivity, are more complex and
more directly impact economic activities.
8 Conclusion
Environmental goods and services are often public goods, and therefore changes in the level of these
public goods aﬀects many people. As social animals, humans are embedded in social networks, with
an individuals well being connected, through this network, to the wellbeing of others. If ones goal is
to measure each individual’s private willingness to pay for environmental goods and/or services,
then that part of the individual’s willingness to pay which is due to their concern for others needs to
be removed. Doing so requires knowing the complete social network that an individual is embedded
in, and the utility of all others in that network, a generally impossible task.
We have examined the relationship between two measures of egocentric network centrality,
degree centrality and transitivity, and willingness to pay for improvements in a set of environmental
attributes using a choice experiment. We demonstrate that if the centrality measures are increasing
in the utility that the respondent receives from an improvement in the environment, then these
centrality measures are positively related to willingness to pay, a result we ﬁnd in the choice
experiment. However, we ﬁnd that this eﬀect is greatly diminished if we include a measure of the
respondents belief that the impact of development on the environment was ’worth it’. As our tool
for measuring the egocentric social network identiﬁed alters with whom the ego recently spoke
about this trade-oﬀ, our network measure may have been measuring this belief. Our results suggest
that egocentric network measures have potential to adjust some of the bias that network eﬀects
can introduce to willingness to pay measurement. More work is needed to identify the most useful
approaches to measuring egocentric networks that will oﬀset this bias.
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